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Beyond MacIntyre:  Grounding the business as practice debate 
 
 
Abstract 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s distinction between institutions and practices helps illuminate 
how powerful institutional forces frame and constrain the practice of organizational 
research as well as the output and positioning of scholarly journals.  Yet his 
conceptual frame is limited, not least because it is unclear whether the activity of 
managing is, or is not, a practice.  This paper builds on MacIntyre’s ideas by 
incorporating Aristotle’s concepts of poíēsis, praxis, téchnē and phrónēsis.  Rather 
than ask, following MacIntyre, whether management is a practice, this wider network 
of concepts provides a richer frame for understanding the nature of managing and the 
appropriate role for academia.  The paper outlines a phronetic paradigm for 
organizational inquiry, and concludes by briefly examining the implications of such a 
paradigm for research and learning.    
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Beyond MacIntyre:  Grounding the business as practice debate 
 
Introduction 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s distinction between institutions and practices helps illuminate 
how powerful institutional forces frame and constrain the practice of organisational 
research as well as the output and positioning of scholarly journals.  Yet his 
conceptual frame is limited, not least because it is unclear whether the activity of 
managing is, or is not, a practice.  This paper seeks to build on MacIntyre’s ideas by 
incorporating Aristotle’s concepts of poíēsis, praxis, téchnē and phrónēsis into the 
conversation.  Rather than ask, following MacIntyre, whether management is a 
practice, this wider network of concepts provides a richer frame for understanding the 
nature of managing.  The paper proposes a phronetic paradigm for organisational 
inquiry, and concludes by examining the implications of such a paradigm for research 
and learning.   It begins by introducing MacIntyre’s ideas and the attendant debate in 
management studies about his work.  The paper then maps out the essential elements 
of a phronetic paradigm, building on Joseph Dunne’s reading of Aristotle’s concepts 
of poíēsis, praxis, téchnē and phrónēsis.    
MacIntyre and Management 
At the centre of MacIntyre’s work is the concept of ‘practice’, which he defines as 
follows: 
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards 
of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.  Tic-
tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football 
with skill; but the game of football is, and so is chess.  Bricklaying is not a 
practice; architecture is.  Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is.  So are 
the enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the 
historian, and so are painting and music. (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 187) 
For MacIntyre, practices are always situated in place and time, in a living, historical 
tradition.   
A second important concept in his frame is the notion of an institution.  Again, it is 
best to reproduce his own definition:  
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Practices must not be confused with institutions.  Chess, physics and medicine 
are practices; chess clubs, laboratories and hospitals are institutions…They are 
involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in 
terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as 
rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only 
themselves, but also the practices of which they are the bearers. (MacIntyre 
1981/1984: 194) 
Institutions are reflexive and open to change: 
So when an institution – a university, say, or a farm, or a hospital – is the 
bearer of a tradition of practice or practices, its common life will be partly, but 
in a centrally important way, constituted by a continuous argument as to what 
a university is and ought to be or what good farming is or what good medicine 
is (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 222) 
MacIntyre then proceeds to make an important and influential distinction between 
what he calls ‘internal goods’ and ‘external goods’.  To explain the distinction he tells 
a story of an adult encouraging a child to play chess.  Initially, this encouragement is 
effected through promising the child some tangible reward, for example sweets or 
money, if she plays the game.  Over time, the child comes to enjoy playing the game 
and will play solely for the love of playing chess regardless of any reward.  In a 
nutshell, this captures his distinction between internal and external goods:  the 
enjoyment derived through playing the game itself is an ‘internal good’ while the 
sweets or money constitute an ‘external good’.    
Crucially, MacIntyre associates internal goods with practices, and external goods with 
institutions.  Applied to research, one might understand an internal good as the joy 
one gets from writing, analysing, reading, collecting data, and the other activities that 
constitute the practice of doing research.   In contrast, Research Assessment 
Exercises, which are created and maintained by the institution rather than the practice, 
are a good example of an external good.  Such goods are “characteristically objects of 
competition in which there are winners and losers” and when achieved “are always 
some individual’s property and possession” (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 190).  These 
distinctions are captured nicely by the actress Glenn Close who, in a recent interview, 
spoke about her love for the ‘craft’ of acting (an internal good) and her detachment 
from the entertainment industry’s intense concern with acting awards (external 
goods): “I love what I do and the craft of it…. I’m aware that the world likes to have 
winners and losers. I understand the entertainment value in that, of course, but as it 
applies to my craft it kind of doesn’t make sense” (Clayton-Lee 2012: 42).  
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While practices depend on institutions – “no practice can survive for any length of 
time un-sustained by institutions” (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 194) – they can also work 
to create an unnecessary focus on external goods which can be harmful to the 
practice: “the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution” (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 194).  In particular, 
MacIntyre is hostile to the bureaucratic manager, who he sees as the primary advocate 
of techniques that can damage if not destroy practices and their constitutent virtues. 
Virtues are the final important concept in MacIntyre’s frame, and he explicitly 
associates them with internal goods and practices rather than external goods and 
institutions:  “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and 
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving such goods” (MacIntyre 
1981/1984: 191).  Again, virtues are understood and constituted contextually and 
historically:  
“[First,] all morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and 
particular…and secondly that there is no way to possess the virtues except as 
part of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them 
from a series of predecessors (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 127) 
And again, these goods and virtues emerge and change over time: “A living tradition 
then is an historically extended, socially embedded argument, and an argument 
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (MacIntyre 
1981/1984: 222). 
MacIntyre’s distinction between practices and institutions, and his association of 
internal goods and virtues with the former and external goods with the latter, becomes 
somewhat confused when he admits:  
The making and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of 
institutions – itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a 
practice which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the 
virtues (MacIntyre 1981/1984: 194) 
Thus, making and sustaining an institution can be understood as a practice of sorts.  
To clarify, it is useful to distinguish between an institutional practice and a core 
practice (though MacIntyre doesn’t use these terms).   
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Is Management a Practice? 
The above summary of MacIntyre’s concepts and theoretical frame is necessary 
before we can consider the obvious and important question, ‘Is management a 
practice?’.  There are a number of reasons why we might answer in the affirmative 
(for development, see Christensen (2012); Brewer (1997), Moore (2002; 2005a; b). 
First, ‘management’ is recognisably a “coherent and complex form of socially 
established human activity”, with its own “standards of excellence”.  Presumably 
there are goods internal to the practice of management – even if these could only be 
identified through interpretative studies of managers – and so it appears to meet the 
requirements that MacIntyre sets for deciding whether a set of activities is a practice 
or not.  Second, MacIntyre’s narrow and prejudiced view of what managers do – he 
sees managers as amoral implementers of bureaucratic rationality – is not supported 
by studies of managerial work (e.g. Mintzberg (1973)).  Not only do managers seek to 
maximise efficiency, but they also copy, follow rules, pursue individual goals, have 
fun, encourage employees, and a myriad of other things that constitute the human 
condition.  Third, even if we took MacIntyre’s narrow understanding of the manager 
as a rational, amoral, efficiency-maximising bureaucrat, the activities associated with 
this character constitute an institutional practice, as defined above.   
Notwithstanding these points, one can also argue that management is not a practice 
(Beadle 2008).   First, it is not compelling to describe business or management as a 
‘productive craft’ since business and management are never more than a means.  We 
can speak of the ‘business of farming’, or the ‘business of fishing’ but the concept of 
the ‘business of business’ doesn’t make much sense. Second, if management is a 
practice, then what and where is the institution with which it has a dialectic 
relationship? Third, there are no good examples of the excellence of business (as 
business) save for vague and rather empty terms like ‘customer service’.  Neither are 
there good examples of the ‘internal goods’ of management that are in any sense 
specific to management.  Fourth, since management is always related to something 
else, it is proper to totally and solely locate it within the institutional realm of 
particular practices.  The fifth point draws on MacIntyre’s assertion that teaching is 
not a practice:  
I say that teachers are involved in a variety of practices and that teaching is an 
ingredient in every practice …Teaching is never more than a means, that is it 
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has no point and purpose except for the point and purpose of the activities to 
which it introduces students. All teaching is for the sake of something else and 
so teaching does not have its own goods.  The life of a teacher is therefore not 
a specific kind of life.  The life of a teacher of mathematics, whose goods are 
the goods of mathematics, is one thing; a life of a teacher of music whose 
goods are the goods of music is another. This is one reason why any 
conception of the philosophy of education as a distinct area of philosophical 
enquiry is a mistake” (MacIntyre and Dunne 2002: 8–9).   
In other words, it is inappropriate to extract the educational element out of different 
practices and put them together as a single practice.  The same logic applies even 
more so to the ‘practice’ of management, because, while it is relatively easy to 
identify an institution (the school), and internal and external goods associated with 
teaching, we cannot easily do this for management. 
MacIntyre’s argument that teaching is not a practice is less convincing if we restrict 
teaching to primary and second level education (for development see Dunne (2003)).  
It has more merit at the third level and raises interesting issues for our understanding 
of the university and the business school.  Indeed one would expect MacIntyre to be 
especially hostile to the business school because not only is it, in his view, an 
institution that fosters and promulgates bureaucratic rationality, but it is also premised 
on the false and dangerous notion of conjoining elements from different practices 
together. From this perspective, the attempt to construe management as a distinct 
practice is best understood as a political (and unethical) move, in which management 
researchers and business schools are deeply implicated. 
 
Developing the Conversation 
MacIntyre’s set of concepts provides a useful critical take on management, on the 
business school and on the idea of the university.  Yet it is problematic on a number 
of levels.  His ideas about a form of life  – based around activities like football, 
fishing, chess-playing, architecture and medicine – are initially seductive, but at many 
levels they are a long way from the reality of contemporary organizations.  He is 
clearly unhappy with modernity, bureaucracy and capitalism, but too often his critique 
comes across as wishful sentimentalising for a pre-modern romantic idyll. Moreover, 
his basic concepts seem much too slippery when we try to apply them, generating all 
sorts of empirical conundrums.  Is farming a practice, or are the different types of 
farming distinct practices?  What practice is a brand manager part of?  Is the video 
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game Grand Theft Auto a practice, just like the game of chess? How do practices 
emerge and disappear? 
Part of the problem is perhaps that MacIntyre has tended, in his seminal book After 
Virtue, to conflate a number of Aristotelian ideas into his single concept of practice.  
This section of  the paper restores some of these distinctions, in particular, drawing on 
the work of Joseph Dunne (1993; 2005; 2011), with whom MacIntyre had an 
interesting dialogue about whether or not teaching is a practice (MacIntyre and Dunne 
2002; Dunne 2003).  
In his masterful book, Back to the Rough Ground, Dunne (1993) discusses many of 
Aristotle’s major concepts but here I will focus on just four – poiesis, praxis, techne 
and phronesis – as shown in Table 1. 
—— 
Insert Table 1 about here 
—— 
Poiesis describes an activity associated with making or fabricating something, which 
necessarily terminates in and brings about a separate product or outcome that provides 
it with its end or telos.  Three types of poiesis or domain of activity can be 
distinguished (though neither Aristotle nor Dunne make this categorisation).   
Artefactual poiesis describes the activity of making some thing, such as building a 
house or making a chair.  In contrast, performative poiesis involves no artefact, and so 
includes activities like performing a dance, or gymnastics.  What is distinctive about 
the third type, influential poiesis, is that luck or chance necessarily intervenes.  For 
example, a doctor may work at making a patient better, but despite the doctor doing 
excellent work, the patient may still die. 
Praxis, unlike poiesis, is not structured around a separately identifiable outcome; 
rather praxis is the domain of activity where the end is realised in the very doing of 
the activity itself: “while making has an end other than itself, action cannot, for good 
action [praxis] itself is its end” (Aristotle 2007: 6.5 1140b7). Thus, praxis has to do 
with the conduct of one’s live as a citizen; it is about activities such as being friendly, 
honest, truthful, loyal, helpful.  In essence, the distinction between poiesis and praxis 
is between productive and ethical activity.   
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Poiesis and praxis are distinct domains of activity and each has an associated form of 
knowledge.  Techne, or productive knowledge, is associated with poiesis and 
describes the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert in a specialised craft who 
understands the principles underlying the production of an object or a state of affairs.  
Dunne identifies two forms of techne: first there is the knowledge that explains how 
an artefact comes into being; in other words it is a form of knowledge underpinning 
the ability to analyse and describe how an artefact is made.  A second form of 
knowledge is involved in actually making an artefact or creating a performance; in 
other words it is the knowledge underpinning the ability to actually make an artefact 
or produce a state of affairs.  An important point about techne is that while it does 
contain a concept of ‘excellence’ (e.g. ‘I know how to make an excellent chair’) this 
does not provide a basis for ethical action.   
Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is the form of knowledge associated with praxis.  It is 
acquired and deployed not in the making of any product separate from oneself but 
rather in one’s actions with one’s fellows.  Phronesis is not a knowledge of ethical 
ideas or universal principles (which distinguishes it from utilitarian and deontological 
ethical systems), but rather it describes a resourcefulness and perceptiveness of mind, 
gained through domain-specific experience.  Phronesis characterises a person who 
knows how to act with virtue, with the understanding that virtue is always realised in 
concrete situations.  It is good, practical moral judgement. Phronesis is distinct from 
techne, just as poiesis is distinct from praxis: “Phronesis cannot be … techne … 
because acting and making are different kinds of things” (Aristotle 2007: 6.5 1140b3).  
And while there is such a thing as excellence in techne, “there is no such thing as 
excellence in phronesis” (because phronesis is an excellence) (Aristotle 2007: 6.5 
1140b22). 
For completeness, it is worth distinguishing techne and phronesis from three other 
concepts in Aristotle’s frame: episteme, sophia and nous.  Episteme is logically 
deduced knowledge of relations between objects that do not admit to change.  The 
paradigmatic model of how this form of knowledge comes to be is the deduction of a 
trigonometric theorem from geometrical axioms. Thus, geometry is a good example 
of episteme in Aristotle’s sense.  Sophia is the ability to think well and wisely about 
universal truths and theories. In contrast to phronesis, which is the wisdom associated 
with the practical matters of human life, sophia is the wisdom associated with 
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thinking about “things much more divine in their nature than man, e.g., most 
conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavens are framed” (Aristotle 2007: 6.5 
1141b1).  Finally, nous is Aristotle’s term for intuitive understanding, which is 
distinct from sense perception and reasoning. Nous is foundational in that it centres on 
the ability to make sense of what is perceived and to reason: it is “the part of the soul 
by which it knows and understands” (Aristotle and Hicks 1907: 429a9–10).   
Gathering these concepts with some of MacIntyre’s ideas provides a useful basis for 
advancing the conversation while avoiding MacIntyre’s tendency towards 
generalisation and deep conservativism.  Four related points can be made. 
First, the distinction introduced here between core and institutional practice is helpful, 
even while recognising that practices are always embedded in one another and are 
always ‘leaky’.  Seeing management as an institutional practice is important because 
it helps us recognise and respond to the corrosive effect that management activity can 
have on core practices.  In particular, it highlights the way that attempts in different 
domains to identify and foster ‘excellence’ and ‘quality’ can work to shift the focus 
from internal to external goods.  In this respect, MacIntyre gives us a helpful frame 
for interpreting the trends outlined at the start of this paper, especially the way 
research has become a competitive game centred on the external goods of journal 
rankings and research assessment exercises, which work to diminish the internal good 
obtained through the actual activity of doing research, which also dimishes the 
practice of research work itself.  Concepts like internal and external goods are 
valuable because they provide an accessible and intuitively appealing vocabulary that, 
when used appropriately, can rebuff and limit the corrosive effect that managerial 
techniques have on core practices. 
Second, if we accept that management is not a practice, then this raises profound 
questions about our understanding of what and how we should teach and research, as 
well as the nature of, and rationale for, the institutions within which teaching and 
research are conducted.  Specifically, the implication of MacIntyre’s argument is that 
we should work to situate management teaching and research in core practices rather 
than collaborate in the inauthentic work of trying to make ‘management’ a core 
practice itself.  Following this logic, it is difficult to see a rationale for the business 
school as conventionally understood, or a coherent epistemological basis for most 
management and organisational research.  This might be fanciful since it is difficult to 
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envision a world without the industry of business education and research, but it might 
also provide an additional and useful theoretical perspective on criticisms of the 
business school (Jones and O'Doherty 2005; Dunne et al. 2008; Starkey and Tempest 
2008) and on the hermetic nature of management and organisational research as 
described at the outset of this paper. 
Third, while MacIntyre’s concepts of practice, institution, internal and external goods 
are helpful and insightful, it has drawn the conversation in management studies into 
something of a conceptual cul-de-sac around the topic of whether management is or is 
not a practice.  One way out of this is to change the question and to instead ask if the 
activity of managing is best understood as poiesis or praxis and to build out from 
there.  There is clearly an element of both, but when one considers popular 
understandings of the nature of managerial work (e.g. Mintzberg (1973)) it seems 
clear that the bulk of managing is best captured by Aristotle’s concept of praxis.  At 
the level of knowledge, it is also clear that knowing how to lead, handle disturbances, 
negotiate, represent, initiate change, allocate resources, disseminate  information, 
monitor, and be a figurehead is not techne or productive knowledge, but rather 
phronesis (practical wisdom), which is acquired and deployed not in the making of an 
artefact but through interacting with others in one’s community.  Indeed since 
‘managing’ can transcend the production of particular artifacts or the creation of 
particular states of affairs is precisely why it is properly understood as a form of 
praxis rather than poiesis. 
Fourth, MacIntyre’s ideas – and especially Dunne’s (1993) more nuanced reading of 
Aristotle –provides an interesting and novel take on the relationship between 
researchers and practitioners, and between theory and practice, not least because the 
concepts of techne and phronesis emphasise that knowing and judgement emerge 
through the lived experience of making and acting.  Within what we might call an 
epistemic paradigm, practitioners are constituted as objects of research carried out by 
experts, and also as consumers of that research which takes the form of episteme.  In 
contrast, within a phronetic paradigm practitioners are conceptualised as critical, 
reflective researchers and perpetual students (Flyvbjerg 2001; Antonacopoulou 
2010). Here, the issue is not about creating abstract knowledge (episteme) and then 
making it practical or relevant to practitioners, nor to instruct or dictate to them, nor to 
moralise.  Rather, the academic goal is to help practitioners in their reflective work: to 
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develop their phronesis.  The conceptual power of phronesis is that it counters the 
desire to create a systematic body of generalised knowledge (‘technical rationality’) 
and reminds us that we should neither forget nor seek to overcome the conditionality, 
situatedness and historicity of human life.  Instead, it impels us to recognise and work 
with the dialectic between techne, which abstracts from past experience of making 
things, and phronesis which is always experiential, modifiable, and premised on the 
value of improvisation and indeterminateness.  The ethics of phronesis reminds us 
that tasks are not value-neutral nor can they be immunized against the human 
condition.  Thus, phronesis provides the ethical foundation for techne, which is why 
one should not try to deploy the latter cut loose from the former.  For instance, one 
might make a table, ‘badly’, for a needy person, or one might play a flute, 
‘excellently’, for the S.S. in Dachau, or one might be an ‘excellent’ HR manager in an 
illegal (or legal) drug distributer.   Phronesis provides the practical wisdom to make a 
judgement on what’s right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust in these cases 
(Nyberg 2008). 
While there have been recent calls for a phronetic approach to organisational research 
(Nonaka and Toyama 2007; Cairns and Sliwa 2008; Antonacopoulou 2010; Rämö 
2011), a coherent phronetic paradigm – in which teaching, learning, research and 
management are centred on the idea of phronesis – has yet to be articulated or brought 
into being.  Doing so will be difficult because, as outlined in the beginning of this 
paper, powerful institutional forces, which are largely hostile to a phronetic paradigm, 
constitute and constrain the academic study of organizational phenomena.  For 
instance, if there was a deep commitment to situated studies then one would expect 
location to be identified in the title of published papers.  However, only nine of the 
most recent 100 articles published in Organization (and 5 in Organization Studies) 
include a country or location in the paper title.    
MacIntyre’s reading of Aristotle gives us a helpful way of thinking through the 
conversations in, about and around management studies, that are embedded in and are 
constituted by the dialectic between institutions and practice.  Building on this, 
Artistotle’s wider frame of terms, especially his concept of phrónēsis, provides a 
skeletal frame for a new form of critical management studies.  While the term 
paradigm might be over-used and abused, it makes much sense to speak of a 
phronetic paradigm, centred on Aristotle’s concepts of praxis and phrónēsis.  While 
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such a paradigm exists only in outline, it can still be distinguished from the two 
paradigms that dominate contemporary organisational and management research: the 
interpretative paradigm, which is focused on describing how things come to be and 
how actors interpret the world, and the positivist paradigm, which is rooted in 
formulating epistēmē or scientific knowledge.  A phronetic paradigm offers the 
potential to map and explore new ways to critically engage with managing and 
organising, as well as new modes of researching, teaching and learning. 
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Table 1:  Framing concepts (after Aristotle) 
 
 
 
 
Domain Knowledge Teleology Ethical 
Making (poíēsis) téchnē Yes (telos) No 
Acting (Praxis) phrónēsis No Yes 
